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A B S T R A C TObjective: In this study, we examined the impact of the Pharma
Economic Act, which was introduced in Hungary in 2007. Methods:
We used detailed data on the Hungarian prescription drug market,
which had been made publicly available by the authorities. We
evaluated the effect of the Pharma Economic Act on both dynamic
and static efﬁciencies and also on equity, which has been historically
a controversial issue in Hungary. We analyzed the overall prescription
drug market and statin and atorvastatin markets; as a proxy for
determining dynamic efﬁciency, we examined the oncology drug
market for some speciﬁc products (e.g., bortezomib) and the long-
acting atypical antipsychotic drugs market. Results: There is no
denying that the authorities managed to control the overall prescrip-
tion drug costs; however, they were still paying excessive rents for off-
patent drugs. Examples of oncology and long-acting atypical anti-
psychotic drugs showed that the diffusion of innovation was on per-
capita basis at least comparable to G-5 countries. While the share ofsee front matter Copyright & 2013, International S
r Inc.
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ondence to: Rok Hren, University of Ljubljana, Jadraout-of-pocket co-payments markedly increased and the reimburse-
ment was lowered, the concurrent price decreases often meant that
the co-payment per milligram of a given dispensed drug was actually
lower than that before the Act, thereby beneﬁting the patient.
Conclusions: It appears that strong mechanisms to control volume
rather than price on the supply side (marketing authorization holders)
contained the drug expenditure, while offering enough room to strive
for innovation. Making data on prescription drug expenditures and
associated co-payments publicly available is an item that should be
deﬁnitely followed by the surrounding jurisdictions.
Keywords: austerity measures, cost-containment, prescription drug
spending.
Copyright & 2013, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
In this study, we examined the impact of the Pharma Economic
Act (PEA) [1], which was introduced in Hungary in 2007. The
motivation to analyze this particular legislative measure within a
single midsize country is in its comprehensiveness and unique
approach toward marketing authorization holders (MAHs). More-
over, the recent economic crisis is making such a “laboratory of
cost-containment tools” attractive for authorities and payers not
only among the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries but
also among Western (e.g., European Union [EU]-15) jurisdictions.
The ﬁnal reason for the analysis is the availability of detailed data
on the Hungarian prescription drug market, which are provided
to the public by the authorities [2].
Controlling prescription drugs spending is fraught with difﬁ-
culties, and particularly notable are examples of the GP Fund-
holding scheme in the United Kingdom [3–5] and prescribing drug
budgets [5–7]. The difﬁculties arise because of multifactorial
reasons for pharmaceutical expenditure growth, which are usu-
ally addressed only partially with national prescription drug
policies. Typically, the authorities/payers introduce two groups
of policies: one group on the so-called demand side (e.g.,physicians, pharmacists, and patients) and one group on the
supply side (e.g., MAHs). If we use a simple equation that
expenditure for prescription drugs E is
E¼∑pi  Vi
where pi is the price of a given drug and Vi is its corresponding
volume, then supply-side policies target mostly the price side of
the equation, while demand-side policies work mostly on the
volume side of the equation. For example, international reference
pricing [8] has been widely embraced by authorities/payers in CEE
jurisdictions as a particular supply-side tool geared toward
regulating prices of primarily branded drugs; while such an
approach may indeed result in a short-term reduction in pre-
scription drug expenditure, the long-term effects may be ambig-
uous because the volume of prescribed drugs may readily
expand.
Hungarian authorities/payers with PEA took a somewhat
different approach and included—among a plethora of other
measures—strong mechanisms to control volume on the supply
side, with MAHs (i.e., branded and generic ﬁrms) being respon-
sible to cover any overshoot of the preagreed volume. In that
sense, PEA is unique among CEE jurisdictions; however, at itsociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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may jeopardize innovation and could even lead to withdrawals of
breakthrough branded drugs [9]. Accordingly, we are here specif-
ically evaluating the effect of the PEA on both dynamic and static
efﬁciencies [10–12], which present well-known and fundamental
microeconomic framework, and also on equity, which has been
historically a controversial issue in Hungary (see, e.g., [13–15]).
Throughout this article, we will present data in local currency—
Hungarian forint (HUF), with the conversion rate (as of March 28,
2013) of 1 euro (EUR) for 304.24 HUF, which means that 1 billion
HUF equals approximately 3.3 million EUR.Policy Drivers of the PEA
It is impossible to consider the PEA outside of the wider package
of the Hungarian governmental austerity measures aimed at
reducing the then (in 2006) whopping budget deﬁcit of 10.1% of
the gross domestic product (GDP) to the Maastricht level of 3% of
the GDP by 2010, with special focus on reducing the health care
spending by 0.9% of the GDP by 2009. While Hungary spent 8.3%
of the GDP on health care in 2006 (vs. 8.9% of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] members' aver-
age), the prescription drug spending appeared a convenient cost-
containment target because of (1) its high proportion in the total
health care expenditure (in 2006, 26.7% vs. 15.5% of the OECD
average) [16] and (2) the ﬁfth highest growth rate in the 1998 to
2003 period among the OECD members, following Ireland, Korea,
the United States, and Australia, which all are jurisdictions with
substantially higher GDP per capita than Hungary [17].
National Health Insurance Fund-Országos Egészségbiztosítási
Pénztár (NHIF-OEP) data [2] reveal that total public health0
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Fig. 1 – Public prescription drug expenditure in Hungary between
curves are displayed: one for 6% annual growth rate and one fo
compound annual growth rate; GR, growth rate; HUF, Hungarianexpenditure stood at 6% in 2006, with public pharmaceutical
expenditure of 25%; the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in
the period 1998 to 2006 was 13%.
Although these data appear intuitively supportive of austerity
measures, it is noteworthy that population health of Hungary has
been severely lagging behind the EU-15 jurisdictions; for example, life
expectancy at birth is 73.3 years versus 80.9 years in Sweden, infant
mortality rate is 5.82 versus 2.56 in Sweden, and coronary heart
disease death rate is 169 versus 30 in France [18]. Hungary’s population
health indicators are among the worst even among CEE countries.
Cost-Containment Tools of the PEA
Cost-containment measures had not started in 2007: The NHIF-
OEP already in 2003 mutually agreed with the pharmaceutical
industry to introduce the so-called claw-back system (ﬁrms
required to cover overspending the budget for reimbursable
drugs) and later negotiated with the industry the price freeze of
drugs in exchange for allowing new products to enter the
reimbursement list. The industry in fact under the claw-back
regime paid back to the NHIF-OEP the amount of 20 billion HUF
(66 million EUR) and 23 billion HUF (76 million EUR) in 2005 and
2006, respectively. The PEA thus built on this general claw-back
system by bringing additional broad cost-containment policies
described below to the prescription drug market.
Supply-side control—MAHs
In this review, we will focus on cost-containment policies applied
to the MAHs. The ﬁrst bold measure was an introduction of 12%
statutory rebate/payback on reimbursed expenditure for both
branded and generic ﬁrms, which substantially reduced the proﬁt2008 2009 2010
Actual 
Actual minus 12% rebate
Projected /GR 6%/
Projected /CAGR 03-06/
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
6 364,250 295,845 310,973 332,929 350,416
364,250 260,344 273,656 292,978 308,366
364,250 386,105 409,271 433,828 459,857
364,250 425,784 497,713 581,794 680,078
15% -29% 5% 7% 5%
90,260 98,298 100,899 109,441 398,898
35,501 37,317 39,951 42,050 154,820
2003 and 2010 [2], shown in million HUF. Two counterfactual
r the CAGR of 16.9% for the period 2003 to 2006. CAGR,
forint.
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mio HUF 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Public expenditure 228,050 257,370 316,196 364,250 295,845 310,973 332,929 350,416
Public expenditure minus 12% rebate 364,250 260,344 273,656 292,978 308,366
Social welfare "co-pay" 15,789 15,893 18,320 19,062 18,943 17,835 17,986 18,326
Co-payment 73,695 82,412 95,956 104,634 119,205 113,137 115,782 116,201
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year-on-year change of co-payment 12% 16% 9% 14% -5% 2% 0%
Fig. 2 – Public prescription drug expenditure along with out-of-pocket co-payment and “co-payment” covered by the social
welfare for disadvantaged population in Hungary between 2003 and 2010 [2], shown in million HUF. HUF, Hungarian forint.
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by the ﬁrm’s voluntary price decrease (e.g., 10% price decrease
would lead to 10.8% rebate) or could be partially or from 2010
onwards fully waived because of the ﬁrm’s local R&D investment.
As of July 1, 2011, this rebate was due to ﬁnancial crisis increased
to 20% for the duration of 3 years [19].
Second, the PEA required ﬁrms to pay sales representative
registration fee in the amount of 5 million HUF (about 16,500 EUR)
per pharmaceutical sales representative per annum, thereby increas-
ing ﬁrms’ operational costs and consequently decreasing their
proﬁts; the registration fees remained in power in terms of monthly
fees (416,000 HUF) despite the opposition of the pharmaceutical
industry; more so, as of July 1, 2011, the fee has been increased to an
annual level of 10 million HUF (33,000 EUR). Particularly domestic
generic ﬁrms reacted to these fees by employing sales representa-
tives as market researchers, while the branded ﬁrms reduced the
size of their sales force; the overall number of sales representatives
in Hungary fell from 2700 to 2300 because of the PEA [20].
Third, price-volume agreements based on ad-hoc negotiations
between the branded ﬁrm and the NHIF-OEP were put in place
already in 2003; on the request of the pharmaceutical industry,
these agreements have stayed conﬁdential despite the fact that
the NHIF-OEP in principle preferred transparency. Any overspend-
ing beyond the agreed-upon expenditure (which in most cases
also includes wholesalers’ and pharmacists’ margins, and value
added tax [VAT]) would need to be paid by the ﬁrm to the NHIF-
OEP. Price-volume agreements were implemented on three levels:1. a single product per 1 year;
2. a single product per 3 years (e.g., 20%, 35%, and 45% of the
3-year expenditure within the ﬁrst, second, and the third year,respectively, although the overall expenditure remained
crucial);3. multiple products, sometimes even with multiple indications
(e.g., biologics), where the payback is calculated by the market
share of an individual drug within the group.
Price-volume agreements have been applied by the NHIF-OEP
to new entries since 2003 and essentially constituted the micro-
control of the overall prescription drug budget.
In addition to these policies controlling the expenditure, that
is, the “volume,” well-known price controls were strengthened by
the PEA, such as internal (“therapeutic”) reference pricing, quar-
terly revised by the two-step “iterative” bidding process of the
ﬁrms. As of July 1, 2011, the bidding has been blind, precluding
ﬁrms to resubmit their prices.
Demand-side control
Among other demand-side policies, the PEA decreased reim-
bursement levels from 30% to 25%, 60% to 55%, and 90% to 85%,
while to 100% reimbursement level the mandatory prescription
fee in the amount of 300 HUF (1 EUR) was attached, with the
maximum total prescription fee per patient per annum of 16,667
HUF (55 EUR). Socially disadvantaged patients (approximately 5%
of the population) had prescription fees and co-payments cov-
ered by the special welfare fund set up by the government.
Assessment of the PEA Cost-Containment Tools in Practice
Overall prescription drug market
We ﬁrst examined the overall prescription drug market by simply
assessing the change in the public expenditure and co-payments
05,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Atorvastatin
Other statins
Simvastatin
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mio HUF 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Atorvastatin 9,682 8,236 10,943 12,698 13,247
Other statins 6,440 3,992 3,018 3,719 4,766
Simvastatin 9,311 6,662 5,162 4,110 2,849
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year-on-year change -26% 1% 7% 2%
Simvastatin + ezetimibe 0 183 1,096 1,585 1,861
Atorvastatin + amlodipine 0 0 305 546 627
Fig. 3 – Public expenditure, including 12% rebate, for statins (ATC4 group C10AA) between 2006 and 2010 [2], shown in million
HUF. HUF, Hungarian forint.
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which are publicly available [2]. Co-payments are directly linked
to equity because of their regressive nature. Figure 1 shows public
prescription drug expenditure in Hungary between 2003 and 2010
[2]; for the sake of assessing the impact of the PEA, two counter-
factual curves were derived: one for 6% annual growth rate and
one for the CAGR of 16.9% for the period 2003 to 2006, which
clearly indicates that the public expenditure on prescription
drugs was unsustainable and that reforms were indeed manda-
tory. The effect of the PEA cost-containment policies due to price
reductions is evident, and the cummulative amount “saved” in
the period 2007 to 2010 was 399 billion HUF (1.3 billion EUR) if we
take conservative 6% annual growth curve as the comparator. We
modeled additional savings of the NHIF-OEP by the lump sum
12% rebate because the data on speciﬁc measures had not been
available before 2010: our estimated cummulative amount in
various forms of paybacks/rebates was for 2007 to 2010 155 billionTable 1 – Public expenditure along with out-of-pocket cop
and 2010 [2].
Public expenditure
Social welfare “co-pay”
Co-payment
Total market, no rebate
Public expenditure minus 12% rebate
Share of co-payment as of total statin drug market, rebate included (%)
Year-on-year change of co-payment (%)
Note. Values are in million HUF unless otherwise indicated.
HUF, Hungarian forint.HUF (510 million EUR) (Fig. 1), thus bringing the grand total
savings to 554 billion HUF (1.81 billion EUR). In fact, our “12%-
rebate” estimate turns out to be conservative if we compare for
2010 our lump sum 12% rebate of 42 billion HUF with publicly
available 2010 ﬁgures [2], which indicate that the overall OEP-
NHIF revenue amounted to 50.4 billion HUF (165 million EUR): The
12% rebate was actually 30.5 billion HUF (due to reductions
arising from R&D investment discussed above), the total sales
representative fees were 11.8 billion HUF, the wholesaler fees
were 0.55 billion HUF, the price-volume agreements for products
totaled 8.8 billion HUF, and there was no overall claw-back.
The public expenditure for prescription drugs decreased by
18.8% in 2007 versus 2006 or by 29% (Fig. 1) if we take into account
our lump sum 12%-rebate estimate; our calculation is close to the
Business Monitor International report [21], which appraised that
in 2007 versus 2006 the NHIF-OEP prescription drug expenditure
contracted by 30.5%. As shown in Figure 1, the prescriptionayment for statins (ATC4 group C10AA) between 2006
Total statin market
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
25,433 21,466 21,731 23,327 23,707
13 354 464 551 647
3,789 4,879 4,639 5,560 6,373
29,235 26,699 26,834 29,438 30,727
25,433 18,890 19,123 20,528 20,862
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atorvastatin
mio HUF 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Public expenditure 2,267 3,685 6,496 9,682 9,359 12,435 14,430 15,053
Projection /trend 04-06/ 9,682 12,681 15,679 18,678 21,677
Social welfare "co-pay" 0 0 0 6 126 217 317 389
Co-payment 908 612 845 1,492 1,836 2,362 3,402 3,935
Public expenditure minus 12% rebate 9,682 8,236 10,943 12,698 13,247
Share of co-payment as of total 
atorvastatin market, rebate included 29% 14% 12% 13% 18% 17% 21% 22%
year-on-year change of co-payment -33% 38% 77% 23% 29% 44% 16%
Fig. 4 – Public expenditure along with out-of-pocket and social welfare co-payments for atorvastatins (ATC5 group
C10AA05) between 2006 and 2010 [2], shown in million HUF. A counterfactual curve based on the trend in the period 2004 to
2006 is displayed. HUF, Hungarian forint.
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2010, with a CAGR of 5.8%. The major reason for the 18.8%
decrease was extensive price cuts of both branded and generic
drugs and an increase in co-payment of patients (see below). The
price cuts throughout 2007 were truly extensive; in April 2007
alone, the prices of 1000 drugs were reduced on average by 16%
[2]. While the overall claw-back on total public expenditure
remained in place even after 2007, it has never been realized: it
seems that all other measures in the view of the NHIF-OEP
sufﬁciently contained the costs.
Figure 2 shows the public prescription drug expenditure along
with out-of-pocket co-payment and “co-payment” covered by the
social welfare for disadvantaged population in Hungary between
2003 and 2010. The out-of-pocket co-payment increased by 14%
in 2007 versus 2006, and with public expenditure falling, its share
of the total prescription market surged sharply (30% in 2007 vs.
21% in 2006). As shown in Figure 2, the absolute increase in co-
payments in 2007 was around 15 billion HUF (50 million EUR),
which is less than that estimated by the Business Monitor
International report [21], putting the range at 20 to 50 billion
HUF. An increase in co-payment was due to two factors: (1)
decreasing the reimbursement level for a number of drugs and (2)
a 300-HUF prescription fee. Co-payment was relatively stable
from 2008 onwards and even slightly declined both in absolute
value and in its relative share; in 2010, co-payment amounted to
26% of the total prescription drug expenditure, which is still a
substantial ﬁgure [2].
Social welfare “co-payments” remained stable since 2005,
being around 4% of the total prescription drug expenditure [2].
Opposition against co-payments is considerable in Hungary, and
in 2008 public with large majority rejected on the referendum co-
payments for physicians’ visits and in-patient stays although co-
payments for prescription drugs were not voted on. In the survey
of 2007, 11% of the people stated that prescription drug fees of 300
HUF, which are capped at an annual maximum of 16,667 HUF (55
EUR), would make otherwise fully reimbursed drugs unaffordable[15]; recent local data (in the period from April 2010 through
March 2011) however showed that 97% and 75% of the population
pay less than 6,667 HUF (22 EUR) and 1,667 HUF (5.5 EUR) per
annum, respectively.
Speciﬁc prescription drug markets
In the previous section, the NHIF-OEP data provide strong evi-
dence that the PEA resulted in cost-containment of the public
expenditure for prescription drugs in Hungary. Cost-containment
itself, however, may not lead to efﬁciencies either in the prescrip-
tion drug market, let alone in the overall health care market. As is
well known, cost-containment may stiﬂe innovation, thereby
reducing the dynamic efﬁciency; however, price reductions of
off-patent drugs and their generic versions may be insufﬁcient,
allowing their prices to remain way above the marginal cost of
production and thus promoting static inefﬁciencies [11,22,23].
Statins (Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical [ATC4] group
C10AA)
To assess static efﬁciency, we examined a group of statins (ATC4
group C10AA), and within this group in more detail atorvastatins
(ATC5 group C10AA05). Statins are suitable proxies for highly
genericized therapeutic group at the time of introduction of
the PEA.
Figure 3 shows the public expenditure for statins, taking into
account the 12% rebate. Similarly as the overall market, the statin
market contracted by 26% in 2007 (vs. 2006) and grew modestly at
the CAGR of 2.9% in the period 2008 to 2010. Statins accounted for
8.0% of the total public expenditure in 2006 and 6.3% in 2010. In
2006, simvastatin and atorvastatin were the dominant molecules,
about equal in public expenditure and jointly accounting for
about 75% of the total statin market. From 2007 onwards, we have
witnessed a clear shift in prescribing habits of physicians as
atorvastatin became the leading molecule, reaching a market
share of 63% of the entire C10AA market by 2010. The decline in
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10 mg 
20 mg
40 mg
80 mg
atorvastatin - packs-per-30-tablets equivalents
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
10 mg 316,913 53,171 102,943 217,556 275,965 393,193 456,090 460,146
20 mg 41,473 22,926 165,500 499,472 730,063 1,331,798 1,773,735 1,935,304
40 mg 52,610 284,359 449,340 637,291 773,674 1,194,641 1,588,795 1,755,123
80 mg 0 0 13,167 32,139 62,320 80,226 97,807 97,099
Total mg 183,089,700 370,937,700 700,991,600 1,206,832,700 1,598,804,100 2,543,148,300 3,342,358,800 3,638,411,400
year-on-year change - total mg 103% 89% 72% 32% 59% 31% 9%
Fig. 5 – Number of units (in per-30-tablets equivalents) and total milligrams of atorvastatin dispensed in Hungarian
pharmacies between 2003 and 2010 [2].
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of simvastatin and ezetimibe, which lies outside the C10AA
ATC group.
Table 1 outlines the public expenditure for statins along with
out-of-pocket and social welfare co-payments for the period 2006
to 2010. As in the total prescription drug market, the share of out-
of-pocket co-payment increased from 13% in 2006 to 20% in 2007,
while in the absolute amount, it increased by 29%. The hike was
mostly due to higher co-payments and the unwillingness of
patients to switch to cheaper substitution: study of GfK Hungaria
noted that “only one tenth of population chooses their medica-
tion based on price” and while general practitioners offered
cheaper alternatives to 61% of their patients, only 30% of the
patients actually agreed to the substitution [21].Atorvastatin (ATC5 group C10AA05)
Among statins, the most important single molecule is atorvasta-
tin, which has been in the Hungarian prescription market forTable 2 – Average out-of-pocket co-payment per milligra
rebate included) in Hungary for all strengths (10 mg, 20 m
2010 [2].
2003
Co-payment per milligram (HUF) 5.0
Year-on-year change (%)
Public expenditure per milligram (HUF), 12% rebate included 12.4
Year-on-year change (%)
HUF, Hungarian forint.years among the top 10 leading molecules. In 2010, atorvastatin’s
share of the total prescription market was 4.3%. Figure 4 shows
the public expenditure for atorvastatin along with out-of-pocket
and social welfare co-payments for the period 2003 to 2010. A
counterfactual curve was constructed on the basis of average
year-on-year added expenditure between 2004 and 2006: we
estimate that in 2007 and 2008 alone, the PEA measures saved
9.2 billion HUF (30.6 million EUR). Out-of-pocket co-payment
increased steadily since 2004, with the share of co-payment
representing 12% to 14% of the total atorvastatin market. Sim-
ilarly as in the total and statin market, the co-payment share
increased to 18% in 2007 from 13% in 2006.
So far, we have not related contracting of public expenditure
to the trend in the number of atorvastatin units and one could
intuitively argue that the lower expenditure simply resulted from
patients failing to fulﬁll their prescriptions or patients covering
the difference by out-of-pocket co-payment. Yet, Figure 5 shows
that the total milligrams of atorvastatin issued at pharmacies
grew faster (þ32%) in 2007 versus 2006 than either publicm and public expenditure per milligram (with 12%
g, 40 mg, and 80 mg) of atorvastatin between 2003 and
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Fig. 6 – Prices (in HUF) of atorvastatin 40 mg (30 tablets) for an off-patent originator and various generic bioequivalent
alternatives between January 2007 and January 2011 [2]. HUF, Hungarian forint.
Table 3 – ATC5 market share of off-patent atorvastatin originator in units per strength and in public
expenditure [2].
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Off-patent originator ATC5 market share (%) in units
10 mg 100 100 41 21 0.01
20 mg 100 99 24 16 0.002 0.001
40 mg 100 100 92 64 27 14 9 7
80 mg 81 69 50 50 42 37
Off-patent originator ATC5 market share (%) in public expenditure
All strengths 100 100 88 53 16 9 6 5
Table 4 – Number of drug ﬁrms marketing various atorvastatin strengths in the Hungarian prescription drug
market between 2003 and 2010 [2].
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
10 mg 1 2 4 7 8 9 10 13
20 mg 1 2 4 8 8 10 11 13
40 mg 1 2 5 6 9 11 12 16
80 mg 0 0 3 3 4 4 4 4
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trend continued in 2008, with total milligrams increasing by 59%,
public expenditure by 33%, and co-payment by 29%. In other words,
this means that both the NHIF-OEP and patients were paying less
per milligram than before the implementation of the PEA, as is
corroborated by Table 2. Table 2 reveals two important additional
trends, though: since 2009, out-of-pocket co-payment per milli-
gram started increasing again, while the decrease in public expen-
diture per milligram (with included 12% rebate) markedly slowed
down. Both trends clearly show the unwillingness of the off-patent
branded ﬁrm and generic ﬁrms to further reduce prices.
Figure 6 substantiates this claim by explicitly showing an
example of the price dynamics for atorvastatin 40 mg during the
period following the implementation of the PEA. The generic
paradox [24,25] could not apply here because the off-patent
branded drug would be delisted if its price was increased,
although the branded drug does retain some premium overgenerics as has been noted elsewhere [11,26]. The premium of
off-patent originator appears a logical choice in the Hungarian
market because of patients’ relative price insensitivity. Lingering
presence of the off-patent originator and price convergence of
generics, however, strongly suggest that both the NHIF-OEP and
patients may be ﬁnancing rents to which neither the branded ﬁrm
nor generic ﬁrms are entitled. But can we estimate the price that
would be close to the marginal cost of production of atorvastatin
without having direct access to this proprietary information?
Table 3 shows the ATC5 market share of the off-patent
atorvastatin originator, which encountered the ﬁrst generic
entries toward the end of 2004 and rapidly lost the share in 10-
mg and 20-mg strengths. As indicated by Table 4, the number of
entries grew larger with each year and at least formally formed
the conditions for the perfectly competitive market, which
should drive the prices toward the marginal cost of produc-
tion [27,28]. In Table 2, we can deduce that the average price
Fig. 7 – Total milligrams of long-acting atypical
antipsychotics dispensed in the Hungarian prescription
drug market between 2005 and 2010 [2].
Fig. 8 – Number of units of bortezomib dispensed in the
Hungarian prescription drug market between 2004 and 2010
[2].
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branded atorvastatin with monopoly position in the market was
between 11.5 HUF (in 2004) and 17.4 HUF (in 2003). Small
molecules launched in 1990s had—as a general rule of thumb—
cost of goods sold (COGS) typically at 10% (or even lower) of
their monopoly price. From this rather crude, but unlikely inac-
curate, estimate, the price between 1.15 HUF per mg and 1.74 HUF
per mg should be comfortable enough and should even retain
some considerable rent for generic ﬁrms. Table 2 reveals that in
2010 the average price per mg was 4.7 HUF, about three times
higher than the estimate above. On the basis of this estimate, we
may conclude that the NHIF-OEP could easily save two thirds of
13.2 billion HUF (i.e., 8.8 billion HUF—29 million EUR) in its annual
expenditure for atorvastatin and patients could save two thirds of
their annual out-of-pocket co-payments of 2.9 billion HUF (i.e., 1.9
billion HUF—6.3 million EUR).
Long-acting injectable risperidone (ATC5 group N05AX08)
To examine dynamic efﬁciency, we ﬁrst analyzed the long-acting
injectable risperidone (administered once every 2 weeks), which
represents a line extension of the oral risperidone, thus address-
ing the issue of adherence of patients suffering from schizophre-
nia [29–32] and associated higher hospitalization rates and costs
[33,34]. The MAH/branded ﬁrm entered in 2005 into a price-
volume agreement with the NHIF-OEP, which was renewed in
2008. The controlled nature of growth is obvious from the
examination of total milligrams dispensed (Fig. 7) and public
expenditure including 12% rebate (Table 5). Because the NHIF-OEP
did not resort to international reference pricing once the branded
drug had entered the market, the price per milligram remained
unchanged until the 12% rebate was mandated. In spite of theTable 5 – Public expenditure along with out-of-pocket co
dispensed in the Hungarian prescription drug market be
2005
Public expenditure 1,093
Social welfare “co-pay” 0
Co-payment 0
Total market 1,093
Public expenditure minus 12% rebate
Public expenditure per milligram (HUF), rebate included 1,133
Co-payment per milligram (HUF) 0.3
Note. Values are in million HUF unless otherwise indicated.
HUF, Hungarian forint.controlled nature of growth, the long-acting atypical antipsy-
chotic achieved in Hungary diffusion that was globally surpassed
only by Spain; in April 2011, its market share in the total
antipsychotic market (N05A) was 23.7% (vs. 26.7% in Spain,
17.1% in France, 13.4% in Italy, 10.9% in Germany, and 6.8% in
the United Kingdom) [35].
Co-payment surged in 2007, and the absolute amount has
been with an average monthly dose of 75 mg around 525 HUF (1.7
EUR), which is likely not excessive.
Oncology drugs (ATC5 groups L01XX32 and L01XE01)
Oncology drugs are good proxies for examining dynamic efﬁ-
ciency; here, we will consider bortezomib (ATC5 group L01XX32).
As with the long-acting atypical antipsychotic, its MAHs/branded
ﬁrm entered into price-volume agreements with the NHIF-OEP in
2005 (Figure 8). Bortezomib’s consumption per capita was in 2010
in Hungary on par with that in Italy and the most developed CEE
jurisdiction Slovenia, and although lower than in Spain, France,
and Germany, it was markedly higher than in the United King-
dom [36].
Since 2007, co-payment amounted to 300 HUF per prescribed
3.5-mg bortezomib vial (Table 6). As with the long-acting atypical
antipsychotic, the absence of international reference pricing
implies that public expenditure per milligram changed only in
2007 with the introduction of the 12% rebate.Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to systematically
evaluate the impact of the PEA in the period between 2007 and-payment for the long-acting atypical antipsychotic
tween 2005 and 2010 [2].
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
3,168 3,633 4,067 4,546 4,950
0 1 3 4 5
0 24 26 27 29
3,168 3,658 4,096 4,578 4,984
3,197 3,579 4,001 4,356
1,128 984 983 983 983
0.0 7.2 7.1 6.7 6.4
Table 6 – Public expenditure along with out-of-pocket copayment for bortezomib dispensed in the Hungarian
prescription drug market between 2005 and 2010 [2].
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Public expenditure 366 1,551 1,729 1,934 2,303 2,562
Social welfare “co-pay” 0 0 0.0 0 0 0
Co-payment 0 0 1.6 2 2 2
Total market 366 1,551 1,731 1,936 2,305 2,565
Public expenditure minus 12% tax 1,521 1,702 2,027 2,255
Public expenditure per milligram (HUF), rebate included 88,227 87,792 77,186 77,182 77,182 77,016
Co-payment per milligram (HUF) 20.0 0.0 79.4 84.0 84.8 85.1
Note. Values are in million HUF unless otherwise indicated.
HUF, Hungarian forint.
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tions for prescription drug policy in Hungary and other jurisdic-
tions within CEE and EU-15 regions.
There is no point denying that the NHIF-OEP managed to
control the prescription drug costs by implementing the PEA in
January 2007. The PEA caused a substantial decrease in prices of
off-patent drugs and imposed a 12% rebate on pharmaceutical
ﬁrms. While the share of out-of-pocket co-payments markedly
increased and the reimbursement was lowered, the concurrent
price decreases often meant that the co-payment per milligram
of a given dispensed drug was actually lower than that before the
act, thereby beneﬁting the patient. We also have no reason to
believe that the cost-containment policies were excluding inno-
vation: examples of long-acting atypical antipsychotic and borte-
zomib suggest that the Hungarian prescription market under the
PEA has enabled diffusion of new technologies, on per-capita
basis comparable to those of G-5 countries.
The NHIF-OEP set up before the PEA an excellent information
technology system for tracking the number of prescription drugs
dispensed and associated public expenditure and co-payments;
while most of the jurisdictions in the EU have in place electronic
prescribing systems, the analysis provided to the public by the
NHIF-OEP is exemplary in the CEE region and maybe even wider.
With such accolades, it is almost impossible to resist the
temptation in adopting the NHIF-OEP “model” all over Europe.
The PEA, however, has some serious shortcomings, which are
promoting inefﬁciencies. An obvious inefﬁciency is that the PEA
is still ﬁnancing excessive rents for off-patent drugs, which
remain a global challenge for payers [22]. The Hungarian off-
patent market reinforces in particular the general notion that
regulating generic prices may lead to price convergence and
inefﬁciencies [7,37] and that generic competition is not sufﬁ-
ciently ﬁerce in a regulated environment.
It may well be that the NHIF-OEP also needed to make in
design of its policies “compromises” with the local pharmaceut-
ical industry (e.g., Gedeon-Richter), which are signiﬁcant local
employers and contributors to local taxes. As an example, NHIF-
OEP’s continued efforts of international-nonproprietary-name
prescribing were blocked by the dominant generic player
Gedeon-Richter.
A 12% rebate (currently 20% rebate and for drugs older than 5
years 30% rebate) imposed on the pharmaceutical industry
deserves a comment. This was indeed a bold move that could
lead to a serious unintended consequence of branded ﬁrms
leaving the Hungarian market en masse as their proﬁts and
particularly proﬁt versus net-trade-sales ratios plummeted way
below the expectations of their shareholders. The fact that
branded ﬁrms stayed behind indirectly speaks for the relatively
low production costs of prescription drugs, which is also the
reason why protection of intellectual property rights is needed[38,39]. In this way, the NHIF-OEP not only collected ﬁnancial
rebates but also optimized social welfare via the optimization of
payments for drugs. Overall, NHIF-OEP’s 12% or even 20% rebate
could be interpreted as a hostile act against mostly branded and
foreign generic ﬁrms (as local generic ﬁrms are exempt from it
because of their local R&D investment), which indeed led to
downsizing of branded ﬁrms’ sales forces and reduction in their
promotional capabilities. The advantage of the 12% rebate is in its
simplicity of implementation and in avoiding legal hassle when
ex-factory prices potentially decrease below the COGS—particu-
larly of some older products with usually low expenditure but
that are critical for health care (e.g., fentanyl ampoules). Another
argument might be that the 12% rebate is just a starting tool that
could be always accompanied by a reduction in ex-factory prices
either via international reference pricing or the so-called risk-
sharing mimicking the UK bortezomib scheme [40,41].
The PEA was launched into the milieu of co-payments while
many jurisdictions in the CEE region still largely exempt patients
from co-payments. When introducing co-payments de novo, the
adverse effect on adherence could be severe. Also, co-payments
in Hungary are collected diligently, while it may well be that
administration costs of applying co-payments may exceed in
some instance the amount of co-payment. Further studies would
be needed to address this point.
Our study has some obvious limitations. We have examined
a limited number of products and one might well ﬁnd the
product or a group of products that would deviate from our
conclusions. In fact, we are planning to extend our analysis to
the wider range of ATC groups, including antihypertensives and
proton pump inhibitors and a wider number of innovative drugs.
We also plan to examine the impact of the reforms that were
introduced after July 1, 2011, and which we have referred to in
the text.
One may argue that deriving the marginal cost of production
from the assumption of 10% COGS is invalid and may at best
apply to a limited number of drugs. A good counterargument is a
real-life case from Romania in which in March 2005 the ﬁrst
generic after the patent expiry entered the antipsychotic market
with 12% to 15% (depending on strength) of the price of the off-
patent originator [42]. Other generics quickly followed by decreas-
ing the price even below the 10% mark of the original monopoly
price. Another more recent example also from the Romanian
pharmaceutical market is an entry of a generic version of an
oncological drug at 7% of the originator’s price [43].
Population health in Hungary is among the worst in Europe,
and it may well be that the PEA might adversely contribute to the
mid-term and long-term health prognosis. Our analysis cannot
assess this impact. In the same way, we cannot address whether
lower expenditure on drugs increased the use of other health care
services (e.g., on the secondary or tertiary levels) via the so-called
V A L U E I N H E A L T H R E G I O N A L I S S U E S 2 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 2 9 0 – 2 9 9 299squeezed balloon effect because we have not considered expen-
ditures outside of the prescription drug market.
Finally, which are the tools of the NHIF-OEP that could be
shared with other jurisdictions in the CEE region and beyond?
The overall philosophy of focusing on volume rather than price is
a good guiding beacon and price-volume agreements appear to
work and also provide enough room for innovation to strive. In
other particulars, the tools to be shared without modiﬁcations are
less obvious due to shortcomings/inefﬁciencies discussed above.
Making data on prescription drug expenditures and associated
co-payments publicly available is an item that should be deﬁ-
nitely followed by the surrounding jurisdictions.
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